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FOREWORD 
In its program of research on management and technology issues , the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) was concerned, inter alia, with compara-
tive , cross-cultural studies of managerial attitudes and techniques . During 1979 , when such 
studies were being pursued, Dr. Geert Hofstede was a leader in this work. It is with great 
pleasure, then, that we reproduce this article, which he wrote during the year he spent 
at IIASA. 
ALECM. LEE 
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
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Printed in Great Britain. 
MANAGEMENTCONTROLOFPUBLlCAND 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT ACTIVITIES 
GEERT HOFSTEDE 
Fosson Europe, Leyden, The Netherlands 
Abstract 
Traditional approaches to management control usually fail for public and not-for-profit activities.' 
The type of control applicable to such activities depends on four criteria: are objectives unambiguous, 
outputs measurable, effects of interventions known, and is the activity repetitive? Depending on where 
activities stand with regard to these criteria, the control applicable corresponds to one of six different 
types: routine, expert, trial-and-error , intuitive, judgemental, or political control. The first three types 
can be represented by cybernetic models; the other three ask for more complex and less deterministic 
models. For these, a "political" and a "garbage-can" model are described. Key elements in the latter 
models are the values and the culture of the actors. As an example, the typology for management 
control is applied to the area of budgeting, covering regular budgeting as well as such techniques as 
PPBS, MBO, and ZBB and distinguishing between investment budgets, operations budgets for input 
centers, and operations budgets for input -output centers. Coming back to management control in 
general, the paper discusses the consequences of choosing the wrong model for a given management 
control situation: it distinguishes between "Type I" and "Type II" errors. It finally ·relates 
management control to organizational adaptation and suggests how to avoid control systems which 
prevent an organizational system from learning. 
There are no universally accepted definitions of 
the words "management" and "control", but the 
connotation of "management control" is a 
pragmatic concern for results, obtained through 
people. One definition by an authoritative U.S. 
author is that "management control is the process 
by which managers assure that resources are 
obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organization's objectives" 
(Anthony, 1965, p. 17). Management control in 
this sense is one of the main tasks of most 
managers - a task in which they are usually 
assisted by some formal control systems (such as 
budgeting and performance appraisal). 
In the Western European and U.S. literatures, it 
is customary to speak of "management control" 
primarily in the con text of the private (or at least 
independently functioning), profit-oriented 
organization. In Eastern Europe, the equivalent 
concept is "applied cybernetics", and the applica-
tions are primarily sought in production organiza-
tions. It is much rarer to find the "management 
control" concept applied to public or voluntary 
not-for-profit organizations in the West, and to 
non-production activities in the East. Yet an 
increasing part of the national resources both in 
East and West are spent on these latter types of 
activities. Even within the production and/or 
private sector, there is a shift from directly 
productive activities (to which the management 
control concept is most readily applicable) to 
"indirect" activities: those that bear no immediate 
*This paper was written while the author was a visiting scientist at the lnternalional Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (!!ASA), Laxenburg Castle , Austria. The author gratefully acknowledges his inspiration by the participants of 
a workshop on the subject, held in April 1979 at the European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, Brussels, 
Belgium, in particular by Mark Cantley of IIASA. He also acknowledges the helpful comments on an earlier version of 
this paper by Arend Hulshof. 
'I prefer using the terms "for-profit" and "not-for-profit" organizations and activities rather than the usual "profit" 
and "nonprofit" to stress the intent of making a profit or not; quite a few for-profit organizations, unfortunately, turn 
out to be nonprofit. 
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proportional relation to outputs. 
Because of the obvious need for people in 
command to control activities, even if these be 
public , not-for-profit, or indirect, it is desirable to 
expand the management control concept to such 
activities as well. However, this cannot be achieved 
by simple extrapolation from profit-oriented and 
production activities. The specific value of public, 
not-for-profi t and indirect activities must be taken 
into account. In the following pages I shall first 
classify the wide range of these activities according 
to the forms of management control most readily 
applicable to them ; from this , I shall arrive at a 
typology of management control approaches. 
CLASSIFYING ACTIVITIES FROM 
A CONTROL VIEWPOINT 
The title of this article runs "Management 
Control of . . . Activities" rather than of 
" Organizations" . It is more customary to relate 
forms o f control to types of organizations, such as 
private, public or volunta1y organizations, or 
productions, sales and service organizations. 
However, within each organization we find a range 
of activities which demand quite different forms of 
control. I referred already to "indirect" activities 
in production or private organizations ; these 
cannot be controlled in the same way as "direct" 
activities. But in many public and not-for-profit 
organizations, we can still find activities that are 
"direct" , in the sense of producing quite 
measurable outputs ; these can be controlled in 
exactly the same way as direct activities in 
production organizations. Thus, for a meaningful 
classification from a management control view-
point , we have to break our organizations down to 
the level of activities. 
Measurability of outputs, as referred to above , 
is only one aspect of activities that determines the 
way in which they can or cannot be controlled . In 
fact, when classifying activities from a control 
viewpoint , we have to take four criteria into 
account: 
(I) Are the objectives of the activity un-
ambiguous or ambiguous? 
(2) Are its outputs measurable or non-
measurable ? 
(3) Are effects of management interventions 
in it known or unknown? 
( 4) ls the activity repetitive or non-
repetitive?2 
Each of these four criteria will be discussed 
below. 
Are the objectives unambiguous or ambiguous? 
This is the most crucial criterion for manage-
ment control. Control presupposes a target ; what 
if there is no clear target? There are several reasons 
why objectives may be ambiguous: 
(a) Because of conflicts of perceived interests 
and /or values among those having a say in the 
activity. For example, in running a prison, the 
director may be guided primarily by a desire for 
maximum security in protecting society, the 
psychiatric staff by maximum opportunities for 
rehabilitation of inmates, and the higher autho-
rities by minimal cost. Voluntary, charitable or 
professional organizations are frequently the scene 
of value conflicts over objectives. The special 
ideological commitment of the members to such 
organizations make them assume the right and 
even the obligation to have their say in objectives ; 
and one member's view are likely to differ from 
another's (Selby, 1978). 
(b) Because of lack of knowledge about 
means-ends relationships in which the activity 
considered represents the means. For example , 
there may be agreement on a higher level objective 
such as "reduce unemployment" but different 
beliefs about whether the proposed activity will, in 
fact , reduce unemployment , leave it unaffected, or 
increase it. 
(c) Because of fast changes in the environment 
("environmental turbulence" , see Emery & Trist, 
1969) which enforce new objectives or make 
existing objectives obsolete, without immediately 
suggesting new ones. For example, new legislation 
that enforces a tax on pollution , or new drugs that 
completely change the role of hospitals in treating 
certain diseases, may call for new objectives ; but at 
the same time, many forces within organizations 
and within their environments push for a 
continuation of the old objectives. 
Unambiguous objectives exist for activities for 
which there are no conflicts of interests and/o r 
2 In an earlier publication (Hofstede , 1978) I discussed criteria 1, 2 and 4. Thompson (l 967, p. 134) classifies c~ntrol 
decision processes by criteria 1 and 3 ("certainty vs. ~n,7ertainty about preferences regarding possible outcomes , and 
"beliefs about cause/effect relations certain vs. uncertain ). 
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values among those concerned. These are all 
activities that fonn part of commonly accepted 
role patterns: such as those belonging to the role 
of a fireman, a stewardess, or a computer 
repairman. More generally, unambiguous activities 
exist where there is a consensus among organiza-
tion members with regard to the activity, based on 
a shared tradition, shared indifference, or an 
unquestioning acceptance of a central authority 
that sets the objectives. They also exist where, 
regardless of members' values, a central authority 
or dominant coalition has a sufficiently strong 
power position to impose objectives. 
Are the outputs measurable or non-measurable? 
Management control presupposes that the 
output of an activity can be identified and 
compared to the targets that were set, and that 
this information can be used to redirect efforts 
within the i!Ctivity where necessary . "Measurable" 
in this context really means "quantifiable", with 
as a marginal case of "quantification" the question 
whether a planned event did or did not take place 
(a 1 or 0 quantification). However, many activities 
both in private and in public organizations have 
outputs that can only be defined in qualitative and 
vague tenns . How does one qu111tify the output of 
an army in times of peace? Of a public relations 
department? Of many management and staff 
activities? Of a ministry of eduction? In such cases 
only the inputs (the resources allocated to the 
activity) can be measured but not the outputs. 
Some organizational experts hold that anythlng 
can be quantified and that the problem is merely 
to find the right measurement. I shall deal with 
this argument, which I believe to be a fallacy, later 
on in this article when discussing PPBS. 
Are effects of management interventions known or 
unknown ? 
Effective management control presupposes that 
efforts allocated to an activity can be redirected if 
the outcome does not meet the set targets. 
However, this implies that the manager knows how 
to intervene in order to obtain the desired 
correction: the relationships between his inter-
vention and the reaction of the organization, and 
between the reaction of the organization and the 
response of the environment, must be clear. The 
"technology" of the activity (in the widest sense) 
must be understood. Unfortunately this is often 
not the case . For example , one common 
intervention when outcomes are judged unsatis-
factory is the replacement of key personnel - say 
of a project manager. Now it is not at all certain 
that this will indeed correct the deviation , and 
even if outcomes improve after the personnel 
change this may not be the effect of that change; it 
could be a delayed result of initiatives taken by 
the previous project manager, when the process 
has a natural time lag which higher management 
did not recognize. Most policy decisions are taY.en 
about activities for which the technology is at best 
only partly understood. Education is another field 
of ill-understood technology: relationships 
between interventions by educational authorities 
and their outcomes on what is learned by students 
are almost never clear. There is an irreducible 
uncertainty in most policy decisions, which cannot 
be quantified into a risk percentage (decisions for 
whlch risk can be quantified can be treated as 
"effects of management interventions known"). 
Is the activity repetitive or non-repetitive? 
Repetitive activities (those that occur daily , 
weekly, a few times a year, once a year) allow a 
learning effect to take place which considerably 
facilitates control. This applies not only to purely 
cyclical activities, but also to changing configura-
tions of repetitive elements , such as are found not 
only in industrial maintenance jobs but also in 
many professional activities: those of a doctor , a 
dentist, a social caseworker. Budgeting for current 
operations is an example of a repetitive process. 
Budget systems never function well the first year 
they are started, but after four or five cycles they 
may start to function well . Non-repetitive 
activities are unique programs, investments or 
campaigns . Because the activity in its present form 
will not come back, there is no learning effect: at 
the end of the program one may know how it 
should have been done , but this is of little help to 
anyone . 
We have now discussed the four criteria for 
classifying activities. The next step is to combine 
these criteria and to identify the types of 
management control that go with each combina-
tion. 
A TYPOLOGY FOR 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
It will be immediately clear that management 
control is easiest if the four criteria mentioned 
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above all satisfy the first alternative mentioned: 
(1) objectives are unambiguous; 
(2) outputs are measurable ; 
(3) effects of interventions are known; 
( 4) the activity is repetitive. 
When one or more of the criteria does not satisfy 
the first alternative mentioned, the situation 
becomes more complicated. Figure I contains a 
typology in the form of a decision tree, which can 
be used to determine the type of management 
control likely to occur in this case: six types of 
management control have been distinguished. 
It applies to most current operations in production 
and service organizations. This type of control can 
be prescribed in precise rules and regulations, can 
often be carried out by operative personnel 
themselves, and can sometimes be programmed 
into a computer. 
Expert control 
If objectives are unambiguous, outputs measur-
able , effects of interventions known but the 
activity is not repetitive (such as a one-off building 
project or the introduction of a new computer 
system), it makes sense to entrust control to 
Orgon1 zot1onal 
oct1111ty 
Pol1t1co1 6 
control 
No Judgmental 5 
control 
!s 
act1v1 ty 
repetitive 
-._...;;N:.::.o ___ 1 1ntu1t1ve 
contrbl 
? 
Yes 
Fig. I. A ty po logy for management ~ontrol. 
Routine control 
This is the easiest case which has just been 
mentioned: unambiguous objectives. measurable 
outputs , known effects of interventions. repetitive. 
someone for whom such activities are repetitive, 
that is . who has been able to learn about them on 
previous occasions: such a person is an expert. The 
obvious danger of expert control is that the expert 
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does not use the knowledge of effects of 
interventions already present among others in the 
organization: successful expert control depends on 
the integration of expert knowledge with support 
from those responsible for current operations. 
Trial-and-e"or control 
If objectives are unambiguous, outputs measur-
able, but effects of interventions not known, 
while, however, the activity is repetitive, the 
organization can learn to control through its own 
failures. Rigid rules and prescriptions are not 
possible but a thorough ex-post analysis of both 
successes and failures is called for. Examples are 
the introduction of new products, services or 
treatments; and the budget cycle for current 
operations. 
Intuitive control 
If, in the previous case, the activity is not 
repetitive, learning by trial and error cannot take 
place. In this case the organization has to rely on 
management control as an art rather than as a 
science, and find a person or persons who can be 
trusted to intuitively find the proper form of 
intervention needed to achieve the desired results. 
An example of this is the process of leading a 
demoralized football club or enterprise back to 
success (in these cases, the leader is usually given 
no time for trial-and-error cycles!). A special case 
of intuitive control is the process by which 
resources are obtained for new activities. In larger 
organizations, this is usually through proposals 
developed at lower levels which will then be 
approved or refused by higher levels. Each 
proposal is a non-repetitive activity; getting it 
accepted is a process in which the effects of 
interventions are unpredicatable. Bower (1970), 
after an extensive study of the resource allocation 
process in a large U.S. business firm, recommends 
a system of reviews by higher management of 
successive phases of the development of proposals. 
In fact, he recommends that the activity should be 
made repetitive, so that (in my terminology) 
intuitive control by those who try to get a 
proposal accepted is replaced by trial-and-error 
control.3 
Judgmental control 
We now have the case where outputs are not 
measurable even though objectives are un-
ambiguous. In these circumstances, the first 
question to be asked is, whether any indirect 
measures of outputs can be found which can be 
considered acceptable "surrogates" or "proxies" 
for the missing direct measures (Anthony & 
Herzlinger, 1975: 141).4 For example, Hulshof 
(1979) reports on control in a Dutch social welfare 
organization. The non-measurable output is the 
contribution of the organization to the well-being 
of the entire target population. Feasible indirect 
measures are the number of clients served and the 
average time spent per client. This is only 
meaningful, however, if clients can be divided into 
categories according to the time needed to reach a 
professionally acceptable level of help. If surrogate 
measures can be found that make sense and are 
acceptable to the parties involved, the control 
problem has become similar to the case of 
measurable output. If no indirect measures are 
available, control of the activity becomes a matter 
of subjective judgment; I have called it judgmental 
control. It depends on the power and influence 
structure of the organization whether there is one 
supreme judge (or coalition of judges) whose 
judgment is the basis for intervention; whether 
judgments have to be negotiated before inter-
vention becomes possible, or whether no judgment 
is possible so that control happens only by 
accident or not at all. 
Political control 
From a control point of view, the most difficult 
case is when objectives are ambiguous. Above, I 
suggested three reasons for such ambiguity: 
(1) conflicts of perceived interests and/or values ; 
(2) lack of knowledge about means-ends relation-
ships, and (3) environmental turbulence. Organi-
zations have ways, however, to resolve ambiguities 
so that external uncertainties become internal 
certainties and the control process can proceed in 
one of the ways described above. One way to 
resolve ambiguities is by the use of hierarchy: 
higher authorities or bureaucracies set the 
objectives which then, for those lower in the 
3 The four types of control described so far show some similarity with four alternative unit structures described by 
Shull et al. (1970, p. 84): routine, engineered , craft and heuristic task group structure. 
4 Sayles (1972, p . 30) refers to the "tendency for easily quantified measures to drive out more subjective ones" - this is 
a Gresham's Law of output measurement. 
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hierarchy, become unambiguous. Another way is 
by the use of rules and fixed policies ; these 
represent basically arbitrary choices but they 
create a quasi-unambiguous setting. A third 
method which is often used when there are 
conflicts of perceived interests and/or values is 
that of negotiation ; the negotiated settlement 
becomes the unambiguous objective. A fourth 
method involves the use of experts, especially in 
cases of lack of knowledge about means-ends 
relationships. The crucial factor in this latter case 
is the perception of the expert by the organiza-
tion's managers: not whether he really knows, but 
whether he is credible to the organization as 
someone who can resolve ambiguity. A fifth way is 
control by crisis : letting a crisis situation develop 
in which the organization comes under exceptional 
stress. In such circumstances stress tends to reduce 
the number of alternative solutions which people 
can perceive and this reduction of perceived 
alternatives may make an ambiguous situation 
look unambiguous. Thus , the 1973-1974 oil crisis 
in the U.S.A. forced a decision about the Alaska 
oil project which had been delayed because of the 
conflict between environmental conservation and 
energy demand objectives (Slovic , 1978 , p. 109). 
When ambiguities in objectives exist , control is 
always political control, dependent on power 
structures, negotiation processes, the need for the 
distribution of scarce resources, particular interests 
and conflicting values ; however , political control 
at the top of an organization can go together with 
other forms of control inside the organization, 
because for the members, the political top may 
have resolved the ambiguities. 
The model introduced in Fig. 1 applies to all 
types of organizational activities, whether the 
organization be private , public, for-profit or 
not-for-profit. It also applies to activities at all 
hierarchical levels, although there is a tendency for 
control Types 1 and 2 to occur at the lower and 
control Types 5 and 6 at the higher levels of 
organizations, with 3 and 4 lying in between . 
Anthony (1965) has defined a framework 
for the analysis of planning and control systems in 
general, in which "management control" is only 
the second of three types which are related to 
levels in the hierarchy: 
(!) Strategic planning: the process of deciding 
on objectives of the organization , on 
changes in those objectives, on the 
resources used to attain these objectives, 
and on the policies that are to govern the 
acquisition, use , and disposition of these 
resources. 
(2) Management control: the process by 
which managers assure that resources are 
obtained and used effectively and effi-
ciently in the accomplishment of the 
organization's objectives. 
(3) Operational control : the process of 
assuring that specific tasks are carried out 
effectively and efficiently. 
The typology of Fig. 1 includes all three of 
Anthony's types. However, most of "strategic 
planning" belongs by definition to control Type 6: 
political control. Political control is rarely 
discussed in management control theory. Most of 
"operational control" belongs to control Type 1: 
routine control. Only Anthony's "management 
control" may belong to all six types of control 
outlined in Fig. 1. 
The typology of Fig. 1 need not be limited to 
activities taking place within one single organiza-
tion; it can be applied to activities involving several 
organizations ("inter-organizational networks"). 
However, there will be a tendency in such 
activities for control to be mostly of Types 6 and 
5: political and judgmental, because when several 
organizations are involved, conflicts of objectives 
are almost unavoidable, and outputs tend to be 
too complex to be measurable. 
CYBERNETIC MODELS QF 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
The dominant model for a control process is 
the first-order negative feedback loop; the 
dominant analogy is a thermostat. From this 
perspective, objective setting is analogous to the 
setting of the temperature. Measuring output 
corresponds with measuring actual temperature. 
Comparing output to objectives is analogous to 
comparing actual to set temperature. Feeding back 
unwanted variances to management is analogous to 
the negative feedback signal in the thermostat 
cycle. Finally, corrective intervention in the 
process is analogous to intervention in the flow of 
heat to the system. The dominant "thermostat" 
model can be extended in order to cover more 
complex organizational control situations. One 
possible extension is the addition of a feed-
forward loop using external information for a first 
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anticipatory intervention in the process (Cantley, 
1978, p. 28), with that intervention always being 
followed up by a feedback loop. A second possible 
extension of the "thermostat" model is the 
addition of second- and higher-order feedback 
loops that control the objective setting of the 
lower-order feedback loops, and possibly may 
over-rule the interventions of the first order loop 
(Hofstede, 1967, p. 100). All these are cybernetic 
models (Hofstede, 1978). 
The cybernetic model really only applies fully 
in the case of routine control : Type 1 in Fig. 1. It 
applies marginally to Type 2 (expert control) and 
Type 3 (trial-and-error control): to Type 2 to the 
extent that the "expert" is supposed to have 
become expert through feedback from previous 
experience; to Type 3 if we accept that the model 
includes heuristic elements. However, it definitely 
does not apply when objectives are ambiguous 
(Type 6), outputs are not measurable (Type 5) or 
the effects of a once and for all intervention 
unknown (Type 4). 5 
Pure Type 1, routine control can be highly 
formalized, sometimes even quantified and com-
puterized. However, even routine control processes 
usually involve communication between and 
motivation of people which means they contain 
a psychological element (Hofstede, 1976; 
Flamholtz, 1979). We can say that as soon as 
people are part of the process, the effects of 
interventions are no longer completely known; in 
Fig. 1, our routine control tends to become 
trial-and-error control because learning about 
human behavior usually takes place through trial 
and error. The cybernetic model now becomes 
complicated by psychological short-circuiting. In 
an earlier, empirical study of budgeting processes 
(Hofstede, 1967, p. 96) I have shown four 
such psychological short-circuiting possibilities: 
(1) people change the objectives rather than the 
process itself; (2) people change the measure-
ments rather than the process itself; (3) people 
make the intended interventions but at the same 
time, they make some unintended interventions as 
well (such as, they ad just cost at the expense of 
quality); (4) people withdraw from the system by 
absenteeism (this means striking individually), 
striking collectively, or quitting. From these, 1, 2 
and 3 are psychological short-circuits through 
which control changes into pseudo-control: this is 
a state in which the control system shows an 
equilibrium without the process actually being 
con trolled . 
The more formalized a control system, the 
greater the risk of obtaining pseudo-control rather 
than control; at least as long as there are people 
left in the process whose effort codetermines the 
outcomes. Pseudo-control can be avoided by 
eliminating the psychological rewards for it: by 
rewarding the interest in the process itself, and not 
in the measurements (Todd, 1977). One of the 
most promising ways for avoiding pseudo-control 
is moving control downward to the level of those 
who actually intervene in the process. This is 
contrary to F. W. Taylor's principle of the 
separation of control and execution. It replaces 
external control by self-control. in which the 
whole cybernetic cycle of measuring, comparing to 
standard, feeding information back, and 
intervening is in the hands of the same person or 
work group. This control cycle is linked to the 
surrounding organization only through the 
standards that are set. We can call such a process 
"homeostatic" rather than "cybernetic" ; its 
analogy is not a thermostat but a biological 
element represented by a living cell. The cell is 
equipped with internal processes capable of 
maintaining an equilibrium in a changing environ-
ment, provided that environmental conditions do 
not become too unfavorable (Hofstede, 1978; den 
Hertog, 1978). Avoiding pseudo-control through 
self-control can be seen as an application of 
Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby , 1956, 
Ch.I I). As a major source of variety in the 
outcomes is in the people who execute the 
process, only these people themselves possess the 
control variety that can regulate the process. 
The cybernetic model of management control is 
a special case of the "Cycle of Organizational 
Choice" as pictured by March & Olsen (1976). 
This is reproduced in Fig. 2. 
If we apply the model of Fig. 2 to the control 
situation, the objective or standard is represented 
by box A, people's preferences or "models of the 
world". In control situations, these preferences 
tend to be controlled by a higher-order circuit (the 
standard setting process). Arrow a represents the 
measurement process. In box A, measures are also 
checked against preferences. Arrow b represents 
the feedback signal. Box B is its reception and 
5 Weick (1974) criticizes a number of assumptions that are made when organizations are pictured as (open) systems and 
warns explicitly against the cybernetic model: "be suspicious of thermostats". 
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B A lnd1v1dual act ions b Individuals· cognitions 
or participation m and preferences, their 
a choice situation "models of the world" 
c a 
c d D Environmental Orgonizat1onal 
actions : "Choices " actions - or 
or "Outcomes• "responses " 
Fig. 2. The complete cycle of organizational choice (March & 
Olsen, 1976, p. 13). 
translation by individual actors. Arrow c is the 
intervention in the organizational process; the 
latter is represented by box C. Arrow d represents 
the technology of the process, box D its 
translation into outputs. 
March and Olsen use their "Cycle of Organiza-
tional Choice" to argue that in many cases, one or 
more of the arrows are interrupted. This also 
happens in the control situation; and in these cases 
the cybernetic model can no longer be used. If the 
arrows are intact, we are dealing with the control 
types 1, 2 and 3 in Fig. 1. If one or more are 
interrupted, we deal with one of the other types. 
Unfortunately, the cybernetic model is so 
attracjjve and has been so successful where it does 
apply, that it is frequently used beyond its zone of 
applicability, because the assumptions that have 
gone into it are not realized (Anthony, 1965, 
p. 87; Hofstede, 1978). In the next section, we 
shall look at non-cybernetic alternatives which do 
apply when one or more of March and Olsen's 
arrows are interrupted. 
NON-CYBERNETIC "MODELS" 
The pure cybernetic model assumes rationality 
of the entire system. For Anthony (1965, p. 93), 
the source disciplines of routine control (which he 
calls "operational control") are economics and the 
physical sciences. Admitting psychological 
elements into the system (Type 3 control), the 
system is no longer fully rational; for Anthony, 
the source discipline of management control is 
social psychology. 
Two types of alternative "models" are available 
for control Types 4 and especially 5 and 6 in 
Fig. 1: political control and "garbage-can" control. 
The political control model assumes that there 
are several actors in the system who each act 
subjectively rationally: they act in their own 
perceived self-interest, but the consolidated result 
of their actions does not represent a rational total 
system. In some such models it is acknowledged 
that the behavior of the actors might be able to be 
predicted by the use of some theoretic concepts. 
We find elements of such a political model, 
implicitly rather than explicitly, in, for example, 
Crozier's (1964, p. 117) description of power 
games in the French tobacco monopoly, and in 
Anthony & Herzlinger's (1975, p. 249) description 
of twenty-eight "ploys" to be used in budget 
negotiations, and how to counter them. 
The "garbage-can model" was outlined by 
March & Olsen (1976) for the cases in which the 
"cycle of organization choice" does not function 
(see Fig. 2: we considered this cycle as a more 
general form of the cybernetic model). Each of the 
arrows in the cycle can in practice be interrupted 
(March & Olsen, pp. 56-59). If arrow a is 
interrupted (Fig. 2), this corresponds to our case 
of non-measurable outputs (Fig. 1). If arrow c 
and/or d are interrupted, this corresponds to a case 
of unknown effects of interventions. If arrow b is 
interrupted, individual action is not affected by 
knowledge coming through the system; individuals 
do not react to the feedback signals received, for 
example because they are complying with standard 
operating procedures .6 
6 Birnberg et al. (1977) suggest the use of "attribution theory" to explain human behavior in control systems. 
Attribution theory deals with the question to which causes people att ribute events; these attributions depend partly on 
the attributors, partly on the situation. Birnberg et al., expand the cybernetic model to reflect attribution processes. 
Attribution theory among other things explains why different people react differently to the same feedback signals. 
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March and Olsen suggest for such cases a 
"garbage-can model of organizational choice" 
(based upon earlier work with M. D. Cohen). This 
model applies to organizational situations in which 
no assumptions are made about the existence of 
hierarchical structures or generally accepted rules; 
the authors call them "organized anarchies". 
Objectives may be ambiguous, outputs non-
measurable, effects of interventions not known, 
activities non-repetitive . Even the participants in 
the choices may not be known in advance, and 
actually wander in and out. The authors illustrate 
their model with data from educational institu-
tions (schools and universities) in the U.S.A. and 
Scandinavia. In the "garbage-can" process, all 
issues that confront the organization at a given 
time are put simultaneously into a "garbage-can", 
which poses a limit to the amount of attention 
available. There are more or less independent flows 
of problems, solutions, participants and choice 
opportunities in and out of the "garbage-can", and 
choices are not only made by resolving problems 
but also by overlooking them or deliberately 
escaping from them. This process is non-rational. 
It is not rational at the systems ievel, nor is it 
rational at the individual level, because self interest 
is ambiguous: people often do not know what 
they want. The one leading principle of action in 
such ambiguous situations is that individuals look 
for cognitive consistency: they try to have models 
of the world that to them make some sense. In 
order to maintain this they are able to do 
non-rational things : to forget, to overlook, to play. 
A key element in both the political and the 
"garbage-can" model are the values of the actors. 
Values are broad preferences for one state of 
affairs over others which are relatively stable over 
time. In the political model, values determine how 
the actors perceive their self-interest : if we know 
their stable values, we can come closer to 
predicting their behavior. In the "garbage-can" 
model, values are the elements of the actors' 
"models of the world" and they determine what 
state of affairs to them will be cognitively 
consistent. 
This means that if we want to analyse or 
improve control of the Types 5 and 6 in Fig. 1 
Qudgmental and political control), we should 
include the study of values in our program. 7 
Without the study of values, policy really 
corresponds to the definition which Stringer 
(1976, p. 23) cites from the Oxford English 
Dictionary: "a form of gambling in which bets are 
made on numbers to be drawn in a lottery". If, in 
these circumstances, we want to make better bets, 
we have tu study values. Values are non-rational, 
however: they precede the use of rationality. 
The "garbage-can" model, as opposed to the 
political model, also has room for rituals. Rituals 
are activities performed because of the subjective 
meaning they carry for those performing them. 
They are symbolic activities, essential elements in 
the cognitive consistency which the "garbage-can" 
model assumes people try to maintain. They are 
stress-relieving. We tend to accept defining 
activities as rituals in religious ceremonies, possibly 
even in social ceremonies, but the ritual element in 
work, business and government is rarely recog-
nized. When the word "ritual" is applied to work 
activities, it tends to carry the connotation of 
"useless and ineffective". In fact, ritual activities, 
even at work, are neither useless nor ineffective ; 
they are necessary and inescapable because we all 
have our needs for cognitive consistency. But there 
are good rituals and bad rituals. Good rituals 
support social cohesion and relieve stress because 
they concur with the values of the people 
concerned, and they have no negative conse-
quences for the organization or any of its 
members. Bad rituals conflict with values or are 
damaging to people or organizational outputs. 
Examples of ritual activities in work organiza-
tions are given in Hofstede (1977, p. 42): 
meetings, memos and reports, parts of accounting 
systems, parts of planning and control systems, 
often the use of experts.8 Together values and 
rituals are manifestations of the culture of human 
groups . Types 5 and 6 control through their values 
and ritual elements, are therefore strongly 
culturally dependent; and even other control 
types, through the role of people in them, carry a 
cultural component. (My own short definition of 
"culture" is : "the collective programming of the 
mind that distinguishes the members of one 
human group from another". The human groups in 
question can be nations, industries, organizations, 
occupations, social classes, age groups and others; 
control systems will reflect the culture of the 
7 Hammond & Adelman (1978) propose a normative model of policy decision-making in which supposedly rational 
expert's judgments are weighed by politicians' value judgments. 
8 Stringer (1976, p. 35) points to the ritual elements in employment and unemployment. 
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organization they function in, and of the larger 
units the organization belongs to, such as 
industries and nations.) 
It is unlikely that we shall succeed in imposing 
on organizations control systems that run 
completely counter to their organizational culture. 
Control reforms have got to be sensitive to 
organizational cultures. It is unlikely that we can 
transfer to a hospital or government office a 
control system developed in an automobile 
manufacturing company, even for similar 
problems: we have to adapt it to the mental 
programming dominant in those organizations 
(Hofstede; 1967 , p. 291). Derlien (1978a) draws 
attention to the culture of secretiveness in public 
administration in Germany. Secretiveness is 
probably a fairly universal characteristic of the 
culture of public administrators, which will 
influence the rituals and procedures they need for 
cognitive consistency in judgmental and political 
control processes. 
Also, we cannot indiscriminately export control 
systems from one country to another. In an 
extensive study of national cultures in forty 
countries (Hofstede, 1979 , 1980b), I found among 
other things wide differences between countries in 
patterns of uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 
1977). Nations differ in the extent to which their 
average citizens tolerate uncertainty about the 
future. For example, such tolerance is lower in 
France, Japan and Germany than in India, Great 
Britain and Sweden; the U.S.A. in this respect is 
very much in the middle. A lower average level of 
tolerance for uncertainty leads to a higher average 
level of anxiety (which can be demonstrated in 
medical symptoms). Higher anxiety leads to a 
greater need for anxiety-relieving, uncertainty-
avoiding rituals. In the fields of judgmental and 
political control (Types 5 and 6), this leads to the 
adoption of more strictly forwalized procedures, 
to a need for formal rules rather than unstructured 
negotiations.9 Thus, judgmental and political 
control take different forms in different countries 
and this should be so, for the deep-seated ritual 
needs to which these processes cater are not the 
same for all countries. There are no universally 
optimal procedures for judgmental and political 
control, while there are very likely universally 
optimal procedures for routine control. 
Even with a profound knowledge of national 
and organizational cultures, value systems and 
ritual needs, political and especially garbage-can 
models of management control systems will lead 
to considerably less precise predictions of how 
control will work , than cybernetic models do. This 
explains the continued attractiveness of cybernetic 
models in control situations where they do not 
apply. However, I believe that a vague model that 
corresponds to reality is still preferable to a precise 
model that does not. 
AN APPLICATION TO THE 
AREA OF BUDGETING 
Budgets are a major vehicle for management 
control. Most activities in organizations consume 
financial resources; some also produce such 
resources. Money is usually the only common 
denominator for all activities in the organization , 
which makes the budget system that tries to 
control the flow of money into a focal part of the 
management control system. 
From a management control . point of view, 
three types of budgets should be distinguished (see 
Table !): 
I. Investment budgets: any attribution of 
resources to assets to be used for more than one 
budget period (the budget period is almost always 
one year). 
2 and 3. Operations budgets for "input" 
centers , and operations budgets for "input -
output" centers . Operations budgets are any 
attribution of resources to one budget period only . 
The distinction between "input" centers and 
"input-output" centers is more commonly known 
in the Western literature as the distinction between 
"expense centers" and "profit centers", but in the 
context of public and not-for-profit activities the 
word "profit" would be ill-chosen. The more 
fundamental distinction is that for some activity 
centers in organizations only the resources put 
into them can be expressed in money: the outputs 
are non-measurable (see above) whilst for others , 
both inputs and outputs can be given a monetary 
value. 
The distinction between the three types of 
budgets in Table 1 has consequences for the types 
of management control (according to the typology 
of Fig. 1) that will be used, as shown in the second 
9 The relationship between anxiety, a need for rules, and a "Quest for Control" has earlier been recognized by Van 
Gunsteren (1976). 
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TABLE 1. Types of budgets from a management control viewpoint 
Type of budgets 
Types of management 
control involved 
(Fig. 1) 
Major 
management problem 
Available 
tools/techniques 
Social 
processes involved 
Investment 
budgets 
(2) Expert control 
(4) Intuitive control 
(5) Judgmental control 
(6) Political control 
Resource 
allocation 
Economic analysis 
DCF 
Discretionary power 
Negotiation 
Salesmanship PERT 
Operations 
budgets for 
input centers 
(5) Judgmental control Resource 
allocation 
Plus 
Performance 
motivation 
PPBS 
MBO 
ZBB 
Policy analysis 
Program evaluation 
Discretionary power 
Negotiation 
Salesmanship 
Plus 
Leadership 
Subordinateship 
Motivation 
Gamesmanship 
Operations 
budgets for 
input-output 
centers 
(1) Routine control 
(3) Trial-and-error 
control 
Performance 
motivation 
Semi-participative 
Budget setting and 
Feedback of budget 
Variances 
Leadership 
Subordinateship 
Motivation 
Gamesmanship 
column of Table 1. Investment budgets are mostly 
non-repetitive, a characteristic which excludes 
control Types 1 and 3 in Fig. 1; however all other 
types of control may occur depending on whether 
the objectives of the investment are unambiguous 
or ambiguous, its outputs measurable or non-
measurable, and the effects of interventions on the 
actual cost known or unknown. Operations 
budgets for input centers are by definition a case 
of non-measurable outputs, a characteristic which 
defines the type of control to be used as one of a 
judgmental nature, unless acceptable surrogate 
measures can be found, in which case the input 
center becomes an input-output center. Opera-
tions budgets for input-output centers, again by 
definition, represent a case of measurable outputs; 
in addition, however, they almost always deal with 
repetitive activities, so the appropriate types of 
control are routine (Type 1) or trial-and-error 
(Type 3). 
The three types of budgets present different 
problems to management (that is, to those trying 
to use them for control purposes); they utilize 
different tools and techniques, and they lead to 
different kinds of social processes among the 
people involved (see Table 1, last three columns). 
In the following paragraphs we shall look at each 
MBO 
of the three types in turn. 
Investment budgets 
For investment budgets, the major management 
problem is one of resource allocation: the choice 
between alternative applications of limited 
resources. The available management tools and 
techniques for investment budgeting treat it as an 
economic problem .for which an optimal solution 
can be found by appropriate economic analyses. A 
basic element of most such techniques is 
Discounted Cash Flow: an accounting for the time 
value of money. Another technique recommended 
for investment planning (and subsequent control) 
is PERT (Program Evaluation Review Technique). 
However, the decisive role in resource allocation 
for investment budgets is often played not by 
economic considerations, but by social processes 
which the available techniques do not take into 
account. 10 
The social processes involved in investment 
budgeting include (1) the wielding of discre-
tionary power by those individuals or bodies 
whose hierarchical or statutory position makes 
them into decision-takers; this is political power; 
(2) processes of negotiation between members of 
decision-making bodies, their advisors, and other 
.. One study dealing with the organizational, non-economic aspects of investment budgets is that of Bower (1970); see 
earlier in the article. 
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parties having stakes in the decision; this is 
political negotiation; and (3) salesmanship on the 
part of defendants of particular investments; this is 
political strategy, or guile. Economic analysis is 
often only used for contributing strategic argu-
ments, as part of salesmanship, and for justifying 
choices that were predetermined by non-economic 
criteria in the first place (e.g. Aharoni, 1971) . 
When seen in such terms, it is not so important 
that the economic arguments supporting an 
investment decision are right in an absolute sense; 
it is far more important that they appeal to the 
decision-makers. Moreover the correctness of the 
economic assumptions entering into investment 
proposals is rarely checked afterwards; and even if 
it is checked, nobody is likely to learn from any 
errors discovered, as the process is non-repetitive. 
Operations budgets for input/output centers 
When budgeting for both inputs and outputs the 
major management problem is perfonnance 
motivation : coordinating the efforts of the people 
involved towards obtaining the best possible ratio 
of outputs over inputs. This is because inputs 
usually cannot be controlled by discretionary 
decisions of management: if inputs were to be 
stopped, outputs are disturbed and the net effect 
on the output-input ratio is the opposite of what 
was intended. A classical example (Hofstede, 
1967, p. 23) is the sales office where all the 
salesmen were found to be sitting at their desks at 
the end of each month because their car expenses 
were not paid beyond the budget limit. In such a 
situation car expenses were definitely reduced , but 
sales and profits also dropped sharply. 
The tools and techniques used for operations 
budgets for input-output centers are the classical 
budget control methods: the setting of goals 
expressed in money and the feeding back of the 
variances - the differences between goal and 
actual out come - to those responsible for 
man aging the operations. Many books cover 
the administrative side of these techniques (there 
are a number of versions available, each claiming 
superiority ove r the other versions). Studies of the 
organizational and human implications of these 
techniques are less common however (Hofstede, 
1967 ; Dunbar , 1971). What studies are available 
show that with appropriate leadership, the 
techniques can be quite effective: however , that 
leadership is a more essential condition for success 
than any particular version of the technique, 
provided that gross administrative errors are 
avoided. Macro-influences like technology 
(Hofstede, 1967, p. 286ff), organizational structure 
(Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975) and national culture 
(Aharoni, 1971, p. 38; Hofstede, 1977) also are 
known to play a role in the effectiveness of such 
techniques. In Table 1, I have called the 
budget-setting process needed in this case "semi-
participative": it should combine participative 
inputs from those having to fulfil the budget, with 
central coordination, to respect overall constraints 
(Hofstede, 1967, p . J 73ff). 
In order to reinforce the motivation of those 
having to fulfil the budget, financial incentives are 
sometimes used. The unavoidable arbitrariness of 
budgetary standards makes them poor bases for 
financial incentives, and in my earlier study I 
advised strongly against budget-variance based 
financial incentives (Hofstede, 1967 , p. 257). 
Budget accomplishment can, however, be a 
sensible criterion with another motivational 
"technique", namely Management By Objectives 
(MBO). We shall meet MBO again below. I shall 
argue that psychologically, it only functions 
properly where results are measurable, which is the 
case for input-ouput centers. MBO in such cases, 
if applied with sufficient leadership skill, can be a 
useful motivational tool because it replaces the 
impersonal automatism of a financial incentive by 
a personalized but quantitatively supported 
evaluation . In fact, input-output centers may be 
the only places in which MBO really can work. 
The social processes involved in operations 
budgeting for input-output centers, according to 
the above, are primarily leadership with its 
unavoidable mirror image ; subordinateship -
because effective leadership consists in fulfilling 
the role demanded by the subordinateship that is 
part of the organizational and national culture 
(Hofstede, 1979). Leadership , subordinateship, the 
task at hand , the culturally determined needs of 
the organization members all contribute to a 
pattern of motivation - which may or may not 
help towards budget fulfilment. The most essential 
social process which forms the main theme of my 
earlier book (Hofstede, 1967) is gamesmanship 
Budgeting is always a game of strategy - this 
applies to all three types of budgets in Table 1. In 
input -output centers, it should also be seen as a 
game of skill: the motivation is optimal if all 
actors involved consider budgetary targets as 
worthwhile challenges whose attainment is highly 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF PUBLIC AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT ACTIVITIES 205 
desirable but whose non-attainment is an accepted 
risk. 
Operations budgets for input centers 
The middle type of budget in Table 1, the 
operations budget for input centers, is the most 
problematic case from a management viewpoint 
because it poses both kinds of problems: resource 
allocation plus performance motivation. Resource 
allocation, because the resources could, at least in 
theory, be attributed to alternative activities or not 
at all, without any immediate measurable effect on 
outputs. Performance motivation, because in order 
to fulfil the mission of the center, the efforts of 
the people involved have to be considered, even 
though the outputs are non-measurable: manage-
ment control in this case consists of obtaining a 
performance of the center that is subjectively and 
qualitatively optimal, or at least satisfactory. 
Operations budgets for input centers are the 
domain where techniques have most proliferated 
during the past two decades. Like the other 
techniques mentioned earlier, all of these 
originated in the U.S.A. which has always been a 
captive market for new organizational tools -
tools that are easily adopted but easily dropped as 
well. The best known technique in this area is 
Programming Planning Budgeting System (PPBS). 
It originated in the early 1960s when Robert 
McNamara moved from the top management of 
the Ford Corporation to the position of Secretary 
of Defense. PPBS transfers the idea of "product 
management" from private business to public and 
not-for-profit activities. Product management, 
however, assumes a situation of measurable 
outputs: an input-output center. In transfering its 
philosophy to the not-for-profit sector, the 
protagonists of the system have rather lightly 
walked over the fact that (Fig. 1) many objectives 
here are ambiguous, and outputs non-measurable. 
They have assumed that by "trying harder", 
ambiguities could be resolved and acceptable 
surrogate measures for output could be found, 
thus replacing (Fig. I) political and judgmen ta! 
control by one of the simpler types. PPBS implied: 
(!) focussing on programs rather than on 
departments in planning and budgeting, which 
meant focussing on outputs rather than inputs and 
(2) taking into account a time horizon beyond the 
single year for which operations budgets are 
traditionally made. In fact, in Table 1 this means 
that the middle type of budget is "dissolved" by 
making it at the same time more like the lower 
type (focus on outputs) and like the upper type 
(more-than-one-year time horizon). 
The impact of PPBS has been extensively 
documented (Anthony, 1972; Lyden & Miller, 
1972; Wildavsky, 1975, 1978a, 1978b; Jablonsky 
& Dirsmith, 1978; Hofstede, 1978). It has mostly 
been considered a failure, because it has buried the 
fundamental political and judgmental choices in 
not-for-profit activities in "techniques" and 
paperwork, making its own cost-benefit balance 
negative. PPBS has been exported to other 
organizations and other countries on the basis of 
the first enthusiastic reports of those having a 
stake in introducing it; and by a curious process of 
inertia in the communication of experience, it was 
and still is introduced as the road to salvation in 
some organizations after it has long been abolished 
as a failure in others. A sober evaluation of PPBS is 
a statement from Derlien (1978b) about the 
results of PPBS-inspired reforms in the German 
Federal Bureaucracy: the reforms have represented 
a significant shift in the attitudes of bureaucrats. 
Measured by the expectations of the reformers, 
they have failed; measured by the much more 
modest expectations of the users, they have 
succeeded. 11 
Another technique applied at input centers for 
creating management control where the budget 
fails to do so is Management By Objectives (MBO) 
which we already met for use in input-output 
centers. In the U.S.A. MBO has been used on a 
massive scale as a control tool for such input 
centers as government offices and universities. Its 
achievements are very modest, however; it seems to 
work (and still only under certain leadership / 
subordinateship conditions) where results are 
unambiguously measurable, that is in input-
output centers (Ivancevich, 1974; Hofstede, 1978; 
Dirsmith & Jablonsky, 1979). In input centers, 
MBO tends to fail for two reasons: (1) it is based 
on naive assumptions on the psychological 
processes between superiors and subordinates who 
will not agree on the evaluation of results, even if 
they agreed earlier on the formulation of 
objectives and (2) the separation of objectives 
from resources and constraints is a semantic 
exercise which has little to do with the reality of 
11 A rather similar statement was made on the basis of research in PPBS-inspired reforms in the Belgian Ministry of 
French-language Education, in a paper presented at the EIASM-IIASA workshop by Luc Wilkin (as yet unpublished). 
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organizational life. Wildavsky (1978a, p. 79) 
states: 
... objectives by themselves are meaningless: they suggest 
that everything may be obtained and nothing need be 
given up. Objectives make sense only in the context of 
resources available to achieve them together with an 
understanding of alternatives foregone. Yet considering 
opportunity cost immediately suggests a full-scale 
analysis, which, presumably, MBO is designed to avoid. 
A third technique developed specifically for 
input centers, is Zero Base Budgeting (ZBB). ZBB 
has also originated in U.S. private industry (at 
Texas Instruments) and was transferred to the U.S. 
public sector in the early 1960s. The idea is that 
the budget for input centers is split by activities, 
and that for each activity, various levels of expense 
with their expected consequences are considered, 
including a zero level. Subsequently, decision 
makers rank the activities in order of desirability, 
and the actually available level of resources 
determines the cutoff point beyond which 
activities will not be funded. This may then lead to 
some activities being discontinued altogether, 
others reduced, while still others are expanded at 
the same time. The documentation on ZBB is 
extensive (e.g., Anthony & Herzlinger, 1975, 
p. 245; Wildavsky, 1975, 1978a, 1978b; Cheek, 
1977; Bariff & Galbraith, 1978 ; Sarant, 1978 ; 
Wholey, 1978; Draper & Pitsvada, 1979 ; 
Herzlinger, 1979). It was strongly promoted by 
Governor Jimmy Carter of the State of Georgia, 
and again (but somewhat less strongly) by him in 
the U.S. Federal Government after his election to 
the Presidency. All in all, reports on its effects are 
not optimistic (Wildavsky, 1975, p. 278: "Some 
butterflies were caught, no elephants stopped"). 
The reasons for this are that (1) decision packages 
for which decision makers have to set priorities 
soon become unwieldy in size so that informed 
decisions can no more be taken; the paperwork 
becomes extremely costly, its costs far exceeding 
the potential benefits and (2) like PPBS and MBO, 
ZBB is based on naive assumptions about human 
reactions to the system and about people's 
political behavior and psychological impact on 
each other. It is extremely unlikely that managers 
will submit ZBB budget proposals that would, if 
accepted, put them out of their own job: they 
make use of many political "ploys" to avoid such 
proposals, or to make absolutely sure that they 
will not be accepted. Beneficial aspects of a ZBB 
approach can only be expected given a number of 
restrictions: (1) a much simplified version, in 
which the request is not to consider reduction of 
activities to zero, but to consider the effect of 
marginal reductions or additions of budget (say, 
± 15%) and (2) appropriate decentralization so 
that decisions would be taken on relatively small 
packages of alternatives by people sufficiently 
close to the activities to be familiar with their 
details. In this case, ZBB is mainly a technique for 
stimulating trade-offs between budget items, 
alleviating the rigidity of itemized budgets in 
which money can only be used for items specified; 
itemization is a common feature of public and 
private sector budgets which leads to over-
spending and demotivation (Aharoni, 1971). 
The alternatives to the pre-packaged techniques 
mentioned (PPBS, MBO, ZBB) in the case of input 
centers are forms of Policy Analysis and Program 
Evaluation (Wildavsky, 1972, 1978a; Abt, 1976): 
audits of activities by, usually, special teams 
including all their impacts: fmancial, political and 
psychological. This is no easy solution either. 
Having such audits represents in itself a political 
choice, and decision makers will always be 
tempted to reject their results. Analysts and 
evaluators bring their own biases to their audits 
(Van de Vall & Bolas, 1977). Policy Analysis and 
Program Evaluation, however, at least do not 
suggest simplistic ways of dealing with complex 
problems, and they do not contain built-in naive 
assumptions nor built-in mountains of paperwork. 
The social processes in operations budgeting for 
input centers are very complex, as they combine 
those described for investment budgets with those 
described for operations budgets for input-output 
centers. For those working under such a system, 
both salesmanship and gamesmanship are at a 
premium, but the games played tend to be games 
of strategy (political games) rather than games of 
skill (performance motivation). The role of 
leadership in this case is, taking account of the 
type of subordinateship prevailing , to turn the 
game as far as possible into a game of skill. 
THE CHOICE OF MODELS : 
TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS 
The argument in the previous sections can be 
summed up as follows : there are two main 
categories of management control situations. The 
first are the relatively routine , mechanistic 
situations, corresponding to Type 1 (and 
marginally Types 2 and 3) in Fig. 1. For this 
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category, a cybernetic model is appropriate. These 
situations are not too dependent on the actors' 
values (although human behavior does play a role 
in them and pseudo-control is a danger) and for 
managing them, the well known traditional 
management principles (technical, economical, 
psychological) apply . The second category are the 
non-routine, ill-defined , ill-structured situations, 
corresponding to Type 4 and especially Types 5 
and 6 in Fig. I. For this category, the cybernetic 
model emphatically does not apply and it may 
lead to a dangerous covering-up of the real issues 
which are of a "political" nature , largely 
determined by values and rituals. For this 
category, only vague "models" exist: I mentioned 
a political one and a "garbage-can" one. 
The practical conclusion to be drawn from this 
dichotomy is that before we use a model (or we 
could call it a paradigm) to describe or analyse a 
management control situation, we should first 
carefully study the nature of that situation which 
determines which model or paradigm is appro-
priate. This is why in the beginning of this paper I 
stressed looking at activities rather than organiz-
ations : different models may apply to different 
activities within the same organizations . 
There are , in fact , two types of errors we can 
make . These are analogous to the "Type !" and 
"Type II" errors in statistical hypothesis testing. A 
Type I error means rejecting a true hypothesis ; a 
Type II error accepting a false hypothesis. In our 
case , a Type I error means not using a cybernetic 
approach where the situation meets the conditions 
for it. A Type II error means attempting to use a 
cybernetic approach where the situation does not 
meet the conditions for it (Landau & Stout, 
1979. 12) 
Type l errors are quite frequent in non-
production public and not-for-profit organizations 
(Anthony , 1972, p. 23) , because in their organiza-
tional subcultures the concern for cost and 
effectiveness has traditionally been m1ss111g. 
Hulshofs (1979) paper is an illustrative case (see 
above). The control problem is the allocation of 
resources to a Dutch Social Welfare organization, 
which so far has been entirely judgmental. The 
subculture of the organization is one of profes-
sionalism and a resistance to thinking in terms of 
"efficiency" when dealing with the clients. 
However, a growing incompatibility between 
(1) the number of clients, (2) the amount of time 
the professionals think they should spend on each 
client and (3) the short and long-term availability 
of resources forces the organization to engage in 
some kind of conscious priority-setting which is a 
form of performance control within the constraints 
set by available resources. Hulshof shows that 
because the activities are highly repetitive, 
statistical data can be collected on time devoted to 
cases. For these to be meaningful, however, 
professionals have to design some classification of 
cases, which they tend to resist. The repetitiveness 
of the process makes it likely that a classification 
is possible which can be used as the basis for an 
acceptable surrogate output measure ; with this , 
the type of control becomes No. 3 in Fig. 1: 
trial-and-error control, to which a cybernetic 
philosophy does apply . The main problem in this 
case is one of implementation : to overcome the 
traditional resistance of these professionals to 
efficiency thinking where such thinking can be 
beneficial to all. More generally, situations in which 
Type I errors can be expected are all repetitive 
activities in non-production, public and not-for-
profit organizations; the more routine the activity, 
the more applicable is the cybernetic paradigm. 
Whereas Type I errors in non-production, 
public and not-for-profit organizations tend to be 
many but each of them relatively small, involving 
only a limited part of the organization , Type II 
errors tend to be few but large. Type II errors are 
made when large-scale, sweeping techniques are 
introduced to improve management control 
processes of the judgmental and political type, 
programs which at closer scrutiny use a cybernetic 
paradigm. 
Time and aga in , contro l systems , imposed in the name of 
error prevention, result only in the elimination of search 
procedures , the curtailment o f the fr eedom to analyse, 
a nd a genera l inability to detect and co rrec t erro r (Landau 
& St out , 1979 , p. 26. 13 ) 
As examples of such Type II error cases we saw 
the introduction of Planning-Programming-
Budgeting (PPBS) ; Management by Objectives 
(MBO); and Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB). Under 
certain conditions, MBO and a simplified form of 
ZBB may work ; but a sweeping introduction 
without regard for those conditions is a Type II 
error. 
"Jn my own management control teaching, I have used the Type I-Type II error distinction before I received the 
Landau and Sto ut paper; we have come independently to the same analogy. 
"Extensive analysis of Type II errors are fo und in Wildavsky ( 1975) and Van Gunsteren (I 976). 
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ADAPTATION 
Cybernetic control systems, paradoxically, are 
systems that do not learn. By keeping the activity 
on target, they prevent it from learning. The 
control processes that allow the organization to 
learn are the non-cybernetic ones, the judgmental 
and the political. In a changing world with a 
turbulent environment (Emery & Trist, 1969), the 
adaptation and therefore the long-term survival of 
the organization depends upon the effectiveness of 
these processes ; the aim being not to keep the 
activity on target, but to choose the appropriate 
targets at the appropriate time. The larger and 
more complex an organization or organizational 
network , the greater its inertia. We saw above that 
standard operating procedures sometimes prevent 
individuals from reacting to feedback signals. This 
tendency is much stronger at the organizational or 
inter-organizational level and leads to "dynamic 
conservatism" (Schon, 1971, p. 3 lff): fighting like 
mad to stay the same. 14 
Ecologists have studied the properties of species 
to survive under dramatically changing circum-
stances. The key to such survival is not 
equilibrium, but a property which has been called 
resilience (Holling, 1973 ; Vayda & McCay, 1975): 
near-synonyms are ultrastability, homeostasis, 
coping, adaptivity, robustness. Resilient systems 
have been modelled as regular first-order cyber-
netic feedback cycles with a second-order loop 
superimposed on it, which periodically adjusts the 
standards of the first-order cycle if the survival of 
the organism under the changed environmen ta! 
conditions asks for it ; however this second-order 
loop has standards that are judgrnental or 
politically determined. This higher-order cyber-
netic "model" has for example been described by 
Ashby (1965, pp . 7-26) and applied to organiza-
tional situations by Cantley (1973) and Argyris 
(1977): the latter speaks of "double-loop learn-
ing". 
The worrying question is: in view of the 
predominant tendency of individuals and organiza-
tions to move to "standard operating procedures" 
(which is single loop learning), who will teach 
organizations double:loop tricks? The traditions, 
dominant values, and political systems of countries 
and organizations constrain the options available 
to managers in this respect (Hofstede, 1979) and 
they are reflected in the recommendations found 
in the literature. 
From the U.S.A., Argyris (1977) assumes the 
possibility of a conversion to double-loop learning 
of the organizations' top decision-makers. March 
has developed his "garbage-can" model based on 
U.S. experiences, 15 in combination with Scandi-
navian examples. The idea of "semi-confusing" 
information systems to destabilize standard 
operating procedures comes from Sweden 
(Hedberg & Jansson, 1978). In a case study of a 
large Dutch corporation (Hofstede, 1980) I suggest 
another institutional solution to double-loop 
learning: the appointment of a person in a "court 
jester" role, whose task it is to collect the weak 
and suppressed signals from the environment and 
have direct access to the top decision-makers with 
unpopular news. In many countries we find forms 
of Policy Analysis , Program Evaluation and other 
kinds of organizational auditing by outside agents, 
as referred to above ; their outcome is second-order 
feedback which , if used , leads to double-loop 
learning. All double-loop learning approaches 
mentioned so far focus very much on the top of 
the organization. An innovative solution for 
management control system with double-loop 
characteristics for use at all levels of the 
organization is Machin 's Expectations Approach 
(Machin, 1975, 1977, 1978 ; Machin & Tai, 1979). 
It was developed in Great Britain and reflects a 
British tolerance for ambiguity which will not be 
as easily accepted in cultures with a stronger need 
for formal rules. In the expectations approach, 
each manager defines what he expects from every 
other manager with whom he interacts in his daily 
job , and what he believes every other manager 
expects of him. These expectations are listed and 
sorted by computer, and compared for every pair 
of managers . Disagreements are subsequently 
14Beer (I 975, p. 497) describes such a system: " The cr isis usually ar rives when the bosses of the total sys tem perceive 
the organization as a veritable chaos they can barely influence, while at the same time the individuals running the parts 
perceive an autocratic regime that ties their hands. The bosses see themselves as uttering genuine policies - mere 
prescriptions; those at the lower level rece ive inhibiting rules - genuine proscriptions''. 
15 March now differs strongly with Cye rt , hi s co-author of their publication, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & 
March, 1963) , o n the principles on which (U.S.) univer sities should be managed. Cyert (who has become a University 
President) has come to defend a highly formalized, centralized object ive-set ting-plan ning and budgeting operat ion, in 
rad ica l opposit ion to March (Dill, 1975). 
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ironed out. Although this looks like a communica-
tions audit, it is a control system as well, because 
it should reveal ineffectiveness and inefficiency 
(reflected in non-matching expectations) and allow 
elimination of these. It should be repeated 
periodically. 
necessarily beautiful, may be the most realistic 
model of how organizations in fact do or do not 
learn. Organizations and policies may benefit from 
incremental improvements to their choice of 
"garbage-can", rather than from making new and 
costly Type II errors. 
Karl Popper has warned us to beware of 
systems that promise maximum good to every-
body, because these usually turn out to bring 
maximum evil. He suggests aiming for minimum 
evil; this is essentially an incrementalist approach, 
fitting in with Lindblom's (1959) "muddling 
through" and also defended by Wildavsky 
(1975). 16 The "garbage-can" model of organiza-
tional choice as described earlier, although not 
To Luc Wilkin from Belgium, I owe the remark 
that accountants tend to see "control" as a 
solution, sociologists as a problem. I believe that 
to the responsible manager, control is always both 
a solution and a problem, and he or she will be 
wise not to mistake the solutions for problems (a 
Type I error) nor the problems for solutions (a 
Type II error). 
"Michael (l 973) offers a grand design for "Long Range Social Planning" through "Future-Responsive Societal 
Learning". He takes issue with the "disgruntled incrementalism" of political scientists like Lindblom and Wildavsky. I 
am afraid his solution is psychologistic (focussing on individual personality change) and therefore institutionally naive, 
and that a procedure like the one which he proposes would in fact increase rigidity rather than decrease it. 
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